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Introduction
Few things are as dismaying to a lawyer at a music publishing
company as receiving a call or letter advancing a previously-unknown
claim to total or partial ownership of a song in the company's catalog
and claiming back royalties. The number of such claims seems to have
increased since the flurry of catalog acquisitions which began in the
late 1980s. Recent years have seen a considerable number of decisions
which, in the main, have illuminated the issues and imposed time limi-
tations upon such claims.
For instance, the following are representative of claims which
have been received by my company, Warner/Chappell Music, Inc., in
recent years:
1) A and B co-wrote a song in 1956, and conveyed it to our prede-
cessors-in-interest. C and D, two other writers, apparently conveyed
the same song to a different company. The song was on a hit record in
1964. In 1981, for the first time, A contacted our predecessors, who
apparently took no action. In 1993, six years after we acquired the
predecessor company, A contacted us and we made a claim against the
other company, which (predictably) denied the claim. A then died. In
1997, B requested that Warner/Chappell bring suit against the other
company.
2) A and B wrote a song in 1969. A claimed 100% ownership of
the copyright when he filed a registration certificate with the Copy-
right Office. A then conveyed 50% of the song to Company X in early
1970. Warner/Chappell's predecessor acquired that 50% in 1975. In
1996, A contacted Warner/Chappell demanding compensation for his
50% share of the publisher's share of income, 1 retroactive to 1976.
When the matter was not resolved to his satisfaction, A's attorney
contacted us in June 1997. The Royalty Department checked the song
listing on our computer, which indicated that A did, indeed, own 50%
of the publishing interest in the song. Going back as far as the finan-
cial records would permit, the department sent A a substantial adjust-
ing payment. However, A's attorney was not satisfied with this effort,
and demanded that we pay A an amount equal to the average share of
publishing income which A would have received had earnings been
consistent from 1976 on. Upon further investigation, however, we
found that after conveying 50% to Company X in 1970, A conveyed
1. Traditionally, the songwriter gets a 50% share and the publisher gets a 50% share
of the income from a song. Thus, if the songwriter retains 50% of the publisher's share, the
songwriter will receive an aggregate of 75% of the income (50% as songwriter and 25% as
co-publisher).
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50% of his remaining 50% (i.e., 25% of the total publishing interest)
to Company Y. Prior to that transaction, A had filed a publisher
clearance form with BMI,2 listing A and Company X as each being
entitled to receive 50% of the publisher's share of public performance
income from the song. Company X sold its 50% of the song to our
predecessor company in 1975. Company Y sold its 25% of the song to
Company Z a couple of years later. This interest in the song was ulti-
mately acquired by us in 1987. Therefore, Warner/Chappell owned
75% of the song, and A owned only 25%. Nonetheless, A had re-
ceived 50% of the publisher's share of BMI income from 1970 on. In
addition, of the forty-four so-called "mechanical" licenses3 issued
from 1970 onward by The Harry Fox Agency, Inc.,4 forty-two (thirty
of which were issued prior to the conveyance by Company X to our
predecessor in 1975) specified that 75% of the income was to be paid
directly by the licensee to A. Thus, it would appear that A collected
the share of both writers (50% of the whole) plus one-half of the pub-
lishers' share (25% of the whole) of income generated by these me-
chanical licenses. Meanwhile, Warner/Chappell and its predecessors
had apparently split their 25% share with A and B.
3) A and B may have co-written a song in 1971. Warner/Chappell
and its predecessors have accounted consistently to A and B as though
this was the case. A contacted us recently to tell us that B did not, in
fact, co-write the song. Up to that point, Warner/Chappell was un-
aware of any potential problem with this song. Upon reviewing the
song file, the company discovered an unsigned agreement under which
A acknowledged B as a co-writer. However, a fully executed copy of
the agreement was absent from the file.
The aforementioned examples represent only a limited number of
claims received by Warner/Chappell. Without a doubt, other music
publishers have had-and are having-similar experiences.
2. Broadcast Music, Inc., one of the two leading U.S. performing rights societies (the
other being ASCAP, the American Society of Composers, Authors and Publishers). Per-
forming rights societies license the performance of musical works in live venues, on radio,
and on television. Revenues are divided (after deduction of the society's administration
fee) 50% to the writer(s) and 50% to the publishers.
3. Licenses which permit a song to be duplicated on phonorecords. They are called
"mechanical" licenses because early licenses were for such items as music rolls and wax
cylinders, which were truly mechanical reproductions. The nomenclature, however, sur-
vives even now, when recordings are read by laser beams.
4. A subsidiary of the National Music Publishers Association, which acts as a me-
chanical licensing agent for thousands of music publishing firms.
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I
Limitations on Claims of Ownership
For more than a hundred years, 5 it has been black letter law that
exclusive rights in copyrighted works can only be acquired through a
written assignment, a concept reaffirmed by the Copyright Act of
1976.6 In addition, as a general principle a conveyance of property
made under duress is subject to subsequent revocation by the grantor. 7
However, this is just part of the story. In recent years, courts have be-
gun to react negatively to dilatory claims of copyright ownership as
well as attempts to set aside earlier conveyances, recognizing that the
passage of time and the needs of the commercial community are valid
reasons for limiting the time to assert ownership rights.
In the case of Jackson v. Axton,8 the Ninth Circuit rejected the
claim of Jackson, a session player, to part ownership of "Joy to the
World." The song was written in large part at a demo session held at
the home of Hoyt Axton, who claimed sole authorship of the song
from the outset.9 Jackson was aware that Axton had filed for copy-
right in his name alone, and that both records and sheet music em-
bodying the song had accorded Axton sole credit. However, Jackson
waited more than twenty years after the initial release of the song to
file suit to vindicate his claim to part ownership.10 The Ninth Circuit
dismissed Jackson's claim, stating:
We hold that laches may be a defense to an action seeking a decla-
ration of coauthorship and resulting co-ownership of a copyrighted
work. Claims of ownership are traditionally subject to the defense of
laches (Citations omitted.) ... [The defendants] have shown that cir-
cumstances have changed in a way that would not have occurred had
[plaintiff] sued earlier... Numerous business transactions have been
made in reliance on [defendant's] ownership of the Song.11
In further support, a California court recently held that a claim to
sole authorship was barred by reason of limitations and laches where
5. See, e.g., § 89 of the Copyright Act of 1870, 16 Stat. 198, and § 28 of the Copyright
Act of 1909, 35 Stat. 1075.
6. 17 U.S.C. § 204(a) (1996). See also R. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 10.03
[A] 10-36 (1997).
7. See WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, CONTRACrS 99 106-107, 416-421
(9th ed. 1987 & Supp. 1997). Although the problems discussed in this commentary could
arise in any jurisdiction, most of them come up in New York, California and Tennessee,
where most of the significant music publishers are based. This commentary limits its dis-
cussion to the laws of those states, and to the decisions of courts located therein.
8. 25 F.3d 884 (9th Cir. 1994).
9. Jackson v. Axton, 814 F. Supp. 42,43 (C.D. Cal. 1993).
10. Id. at 43-44.
11. Jackson, 25 F.3d at 887-88.
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the claimant received co-writer royalties without objection for 28
years, even though the writer claimed that the 1966 agreement bearing
his signature was a forgery. 12
A wait of decades in such matters is not required. In Zuill v. Sha-
nahan,13 the Ninth Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of the
defense under the three-year Copyright Act statute of limitations,
where the alleged creators of the music for a learn-to-read program
waited four years to sue after the creator of the program repudiated
their claim.
In Merchant v. Levy, 14 the Second Circuit overturned a decision
by the Southern District of New York15 in favor of members of the re-
cording group "Frankie Lymon and the Teenagers." The district court
had held that the group members could recover the copyright in their
song, "Why Do Fools Fall In Love?," because it had been acquired
from them under duress by the late Morris Levy. 16 Moreover, they had
been afraid to bring suit during Mr. Levy's lifetime for fear of poten-
tially violent retaliation if they did so.17 Nevertheless, the Second Cir-
cuit held that, absent evidence that the plaintiffs did not know or have
reason to know of the three-year statute of limitations for copyright
claims, their claim was barred. 18
In both Zuill and Merchant, the songs in question had been con-
veyed by the original owners to bona fide purchasers without knowl-
edge of the adverse claims. The courts held in favor of the bona fide
purchasers, because permitting writers (in the case of Jackson, the al-
leged co-writer, and Hudspeth, the alleged sole author) to sit idle for a
generation before coming forward to claim or reclaim their works for
the first time would unduly burden the flow of commerce in the indus-
try.
On the other hand, the Fifth Circuit in Goodman v. Lee, permit-
ted the plaintiff to pursue a thirty year old claim. 19 In Goodman, the
plaintiff, Shirley Goodman, asserted that she was co-author of the
1956 hit, "Let The Good Times Roll."20 To circumvent a laches de-
12. Hudspeth v. Barton Music & Affiliates, Case No. CV 96-8286 MRP (C.D. Cal.
1996).
13. 80 F.3d 1366 (9th Cir. 1996).
14. 92 F.3d 51 (2d Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 136 L. Ed. 2d 833 (1997).
15. 828 F. Supp. 1048 (S.D.N.Y. 1993).
16. 92 F.3d at 51.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 56.
19. 78 F.3d 1007 (5th Cir. 1996).
20. Id. at 1009.
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fense, Goodman argued that, until 1984, she was unaware and had no
reason to know that the song had been registered for copyright in the
sole name of Leonard Lee, the co-author.21 The Fifth Circuit rejected
Lee's heirs' argument that Goodman's claim was barred by the Copy-
right Act's three-year statute of limitations.22 The court held that
while the question of whether or not Goodman was a co-author was a
question arising under the Copyright Act, once it was established that
she was a co-author, the applicable limitations period was to be found
in Louisiana state law, which provided a ten-year limitations period in
actions for accountings.23 In addition, Goodman's claim was not
barred by laches, because there was no inexcusable delay on her part
in bringing suit.24 Of course, one might well ask whether there could
ever be "reason to know" if the failure of a professional songwriter
and performer to notice the absence of royalties for almost thirty
years was insufficient. This case represents a distinctly minority posi-
tion.
II
Limitations on Claims for Royalties
A. Contractual Claims
Most music publishing contracts contain limitations, usually two
to four years, on the period during which the writer may audit the
company and/or sue. In addition, several publishing companies specify
that an accounting period will be deemed final and binding if specific
written objection is not received by the company within a specified
period, usually in the neighborhood of two years.
Such clauses will generally be enforced if they are reasonable in
scope and do not constitute a penalty.25 Courts have upheld periods as
short as one year,26 and even 90 days.27 This will not be the case, how-
ever, if the claim is based upon fraud.28 For example, while the general
21. Id. at 1010.
22. Id. at 1013.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 1014.
25. See 1 N.Y. JUR. 2D 164; Sapinkopf v. Cunard S.S. Co., 254 N.Y. 111 (1930).
26. Rudin v. Disanza, 202 A.D.2d 202 (1st Dept.), app. denied, 83 N.Y.2d 760 (1994).
27. Krohn v. Felix Indus., 226 A.D.2d 506 (2d Dept. 1996).
28. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 171(2) (1979). Of course, fraud must
be pleaded with specificity. 5 WITKIN, CAL. PROCEDURE, PLEADINGS § 669, 125 (4th ed.
1997). The mere failure to pay royalties does not amount to fraud. Nolan v. Sam Fox Pub-
lishing Co., 499 F.2d 1394, 1397 (2d Cir. 1974). See also Cafferty v. Scotti Bros. Records,
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contractual statute of limitations in New York-in the absence of a
contrary contractual provision-is six years from the occurrence of the
breach, the limitations period in an action based upon fraud is the
longer of eight years following the occurrence, or two years following
the date when the claimant discovered the fraud or could have done so
with reasonable diligence.29
Furthermore, claimants under contract to a music publishing
company or its predecessor-in-interest frequently seek to avoid con-
tractual time limitations or to extend the available time periods by
claiming that the music publisher is a fiduciary. Such claims are based
upon the theory that a fiduciary owes a beneficiary the highest duties
of care, and the statute of limitations applicable to a fiduciary gener-
ally should therefore run only from the time when the beneficiary dis-
covers a breach of obligation on the part of the fiduciary. 30
However, courts have been reluctant to characterize the relation-
ship between a music publisher and a writer as fiduciary. Rather, it is
viewed as generally that of debtor and creditor. In Carter v. Goodman
Group Music Publishers, the court held that "[i]n the absence of spe-
cial circumstances, no fiduciary relationship exists between a music
publisher and composers as a matter of law."31
In Carter, the music publisher had purchased catalogs for
$200,000 in 1965. Upon discovering that some of the songs conveyed
by one of the sellers turned out not to be owned by that seller, the
publisher stopped paying royalties to that seller by notice sent in 1970,
relying upon contractual warranties and representations.3 2 In 1968, the
other seller requested a loan from the publisher. As a condition of the
loan, the publisher required the borrower to waive songwriter royal-
ties if the loan was not recouped or repaid within two years. The bor-
rower was unable to satisfy the loan either through repayment or re-
coupment and the publisher ceased making royalty payments.33
Inc., 969 F. Supp. 1993 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
29. N.Y. C.P.L.R. §§ 203(f), 213 subd. 2(d) (McKinney 1990).
30. In California, this period is three years from the discovery by the aggrieved party
of the facts constituting the fraud. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 338(d) (West 1996).
31. 848 F. Supp. 438, 445 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (citing Rodgers v. Roulette Records, Inc.,
677 F. Supp. 731, 738-39 (S.D.N.Y. 1988)) (finding royalty agreement was solely contrac-
tual in nature and created no fiduciary relationship between the parties). See also Mellen-
camp v. Riva Music Ltd., 698 F. Supp. 1154, 1159-60 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (finding as a matter
of law that the relationship between composer and publisher is only contractual and no
other relationship exists).
32. Carter, 848 F. Supp. at 440.
33. Id.
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Although the writer's heirs admitted knowing as far back as 1986
that their predecessor had felt himself cheated by the 1965 agree-
ments, they did not file suit for over seven years thereafter.3 4 The
court granted summary judgment for the publisher, finding that no
acts had been alleged which would serve to establish a special rela-
tionship, and that the plaintiffs' time to sue had elapsed even under
the fraud statute of limitations.35 It is also worth noting that the court
found that the statute of limitations applicable to cases of duress and
unconscionability had also expired.36
Notwithstanding the favorable outcome of Carter, publishers face
uncertainty because many older agreements contain no mention of
audit rights whatsoever and set no limits upon the time for com-
mencement of actions for back royalties. What then? Is there any right
to audit, and if so, is it unlimited in time? Since, as the court indicates
in Carter, the writer/publisher relationship is based upon a purely con-
tractual relationship,37 there would appear to be no right of the writer
to force an audit in the absence of a contractual provision therefor.
Since the mere necessity that an accounting be rendered in order for
plaintiff to ascertain the amount due on a contract with the defendant
is insufficient to justify an equitable action for an accounting,38 it
would seem a fortiori that the contractual right to receive: royalties
does not carry with it the inherent right to audit.39 If the claimant is
receiving royalty statements, the answer may depend upon the degree
to which the publisher's royalty statements disclose the basis upon
which royalties are paid (or are not paid). If the statements fairly dis-
close that basis, the recipient may be chargeable with constructive no-
tice and the statute of limitations should run from the point of receipt
of the statement. In any case, retention of a statement without objec-
tion for an unreasonable length of time may result in an account
stated.4" Subsequent statements on the same account will not serve to
extend the time within which suit may be brought.41 Even if the claim-
34. Id. at 444.
35. Id. at 445 (citing N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 213(8) (McKinney 1990)).
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. See, e.g., 1 N.Y.JUR. 2D Accounts & Accounting § 18; Klonick v. Equitable Life
Ins. Co., 77 Misc. 2d 246 (Sup. Ct. Monroe Co. 1974).
39. See, e.g., Elliiot-McGowan Prods. v. Republic Prods., Inc., 145 F. Supp. 48
(S.D.N.Y. 1956) (no right to audit after expiration of contractually-prescribed two-year
audit period).
40. See, e.g., 1 N.Y.JUR. 2D Accounts & Accounting § 19.
41. National Lumber Co. v. Tejunga Valley Rock Co., 22 Cal. App. 2d 726, 730 (2d
Dist. 1913).
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ant is not receiving royalty statements, but should have been, the
company may nonetheless be able to take the position that the claim-
ant should have come forward at some earlier point in time.42
B. Non-Contractual Claims
Non-contractual claims arise frequently where rights have re-
verted because of the death of the writer of a pre-January 1, 1978
composition who has granted renewal rights to a publisher prior to the
second term of copyright, but dies prior to the commencement of the
twenty-eighth year of the first term of copyright. Such claims also oc-
cur where income is collected during the nineteen-year extension cre-
ated by the Copyright Act of 1976 although rights have been recap-
tured by the writer or the writers' successors-in-interest. In such cases,
the claimants have terminated the rights previously granted to the
publisher by contract and the claim will probably be based upon
copyright. In these instances, the damage claim will be limited to three
years prior to the filing of the action, pursuant to the 1976 Copyright
Act.
43
Suppose state law provides a longer statute of limitation in cases
of conversion or constructive trust. Although Goodman v. Lee44 ap-
pears to be a minority view, the possibility exists that longer statute of
limitations periods may be applied in late-claim situations. And, of
course, if fraud is present, a whole different set of rules is invoked.45
However, the Zuill court indicated that:
[B]ecause [the plaintiffs] have no infringement claim, we cannot
identify an asserted right of plaintiffs which can withstand the statute
of limitations. The remedy they seek is a declaration that they are
co-owners, and none of the subsidiary remedies, for accounting and
so forth, are independent of that remedy.46
It seems, therefore, that in the majority of jurisdictions, the
Copyright Act limitations period would similarly foreclose pendent
state remedies based upon the same, essentially copyright, claim. But
42. See, e.g., Merchant v. Levy, 92 F.3d 51, 56 (2d Cir. 1996).
43. 17 U.S.C. § 507(a) (1996). However, it should be noted that in the case of Ahlert v.
Warner/Chappell Music, Inc., 96 Civ. 0985 (S.D.N.Y. 1997), the court did not recognize any
such limitation. The court ordered Warner/Chappell Music, Inc. to pay over to the plaintiff
all mechanical royalties collected from inception of the 19-year extension period, except
for sales of the original A&M catalog-numbered record embodying a recording by Joe
Cocker, with respect to "Bye Bye Blackbird" in 1982. The order is currently on appeal to
the Second Circuit.
44. 78 F.3d 1007 (5th Cir. 1996).
45. A discussion of the rules regarding fraud is beyond the scope of this paper.
46. 80 F.3d at 1366.
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this would not necessarily be the case where the claim is contractually
based.
III
Conclusion
To ensure the efficient administration of copyright interests,
courts should apply the applicable statute of limitations as well as the
equitable doctrine of laches to limit claims to copyright ownership and
claims for royalty payments, where these claims are truly stale. Music
publishing companies such as Warner/Chappell are good faith pur-
chasers of publishing rights, and as such must rely upon notions of
commercial stability within the marketplace. To allow the prosecution
of stale claims would impede the continued growth and vitality of the
music publishing industry. It is also prohibitive for companies to de-
fend against these claims. Thus, the courts should not allow heirs of
copyrighted works or other suitors to revive claims which have long
since lapsed.
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